On September 29, 2014 the Eleventh Circuit unanimously reversed the controversial lower court ruling in Mais v Gulf Coast Collection Bureau. See Docket No. 13-14008 (11th Circuit Sept. 29, 2014). In Mais, the plaintiff’s cellphone number was provided to a Florida emergency room in connection with the plaintiff’s receipt of medical services. The plaintiff’s medical debt went unpaid and the account was forwarded to collections. Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), against the hospital-based radiology provider and the third-party debt collector for making autodialed calls to his cellphone. The debt collector, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within the statutory exception for “prior express consent,” as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC concluded in its 2008 Ruling that “the provision of a cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by the cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding the debt.” The FCC further concluded in its 2008 Ruling that “calls placed by a third party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call.”
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding that the FCC’s interpretation of “prior express consent” was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA, and alternatively, that the 2008 FCC Ruling did not apply to medical debts and was therefore inapplicable to the case at hand. In reversing the ruling, the Eleventh Circuit found that “the district court lacked the power to consider in any way the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and also erred in concluding that the FCC’s interpretation did not control the disposition of the case.”
Importantly, the Hobbs Act provides that courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of all FCC final orders. By refusing to enforce the FCC’s interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court exceeded its power. The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that the FCC did not distinguish or exclude medical creditors from the 2008 Ruling, but rather the general language contained in the Ruling was meant to reach a wide range of creditors and collectors, including those pursuing medical debts. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the partial grant of summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Gulf Coast.
The Eleventh Circuit is the first federal appellate court ruling that clarifies the scope of the 2008 FCC Ruling. While the majority of courts have deferred to the FCC’s Ruling, the judge in Mais has twice ruled contrary to the 2008 FCC Ruling. See also Lusskin v. Seminole Comedy, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86192 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2013). The only other district court to do so is the Southern District of New York, which recently disregarded the 2008 FCC Ruling when it granted class certification in Zyburo v. NCSPlus, Inc. Notably, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may soon rule on the issue too, as the defendant in Zyburo has recently filed a petition for permission to appeal the class certification order with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
For more information on the Mais decision and/or the TCPA generally, contact Katherine Olson at (312) 334-3444 or email@example.com.