The Sixth Circuit recently made a ruling which expanded the definition of “person” under the FDCPA to include artificial entities such as corporations or limited liability companies for purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. In Anarion Investments LLC v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC et al., the district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiff, a limited liability company, was not a “person” under the FDCPA and could not recover under the statute’s civil liability provision. This provision states that a debt collector who fails to comply with the FDCPA “with respect to any person is liable to such person.” On appeal, the Sixth Circuit decided that under this provision, the term “person” includes artificial entities and natural persons. The Sixth Circuit relied on the federal dictionary for the definition of “person” which includes artificial entities unless the context indicates otherwise. The Sixth Circuit clearly ignored the FDCPA’s statutory purpose as the FDCPA’s legislative history and purpose to protect natural persons from abusive debt collection practices clearly “indicates otherwise” so as to not include artificial entities. Despite expanding the definition of “person” under Section 1692k, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion is unlikely to make a large impact because the FDCPA only applies to consumer debts - those incurred for personal, family, or household purposes. Nonetheless, this type of ruling is troublesome as it demonstrates the unpredictability of court’s interpretations of even those terms that are defined within the statute.
For more information on this topic, contact Stephanie A. Strickler at 312-334-3465 or at email@example.com.